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     The  comparative  history  of  a  Big  Push  in  two  regions  of
Northern Honduras elicits that market power can play two
important roles in the implementing of a Big Push. Under strong
institutions, firms with strategic market power will support the
State’s efforts, greatly reducing the cost of a Big Push.
Conversely, when institutions are weak, the presence of market
power can undermine the Big Push, as it did in Honduras.  To
successfully implement a Big Push policy in a weak institutional
environment, the government must take costly action to develop
competitive markets, and the Push may become unaffordable.
      The conclusions of the case history are then generalized and
operationalized. A theoretical model indicates how considerations
of market power can be incorporated in the existing literature, and
corroborates the results of the case history.
                                                
x   Support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Mellon Foundation is gratefully acknowledged,
as is the hospitality of the Pan-American Agriculture School in Honduras.
    My deepest thanks to Avner Greif and to Julie Anderson Schaffner, and many thanks to Tim Bresnahan,
Hector Chavez, Joshua Gans, Tue Gørgens, Thomas Hellmann, Harumi Ito, Jolyne Melmed-Sanjak, Geeta
Singh, Scott Stern, and Andy Thorpe.  I am indebted to Frank Ellis, Mario Posas and Ramon Salgado for
providing documentation, and to interview respondents.  Correspondence to C.de.Fontenay@unsw.edu.au.2
Introduction
Development theory has changed its focus dramatically in the last decade.
More formal treatment of complementarities, and more empirical evidence of their
importance, has renewed our interest in theories based on complementarities, namely
Big Push theory and Endogenous Growth theory.
1  Complementarities (or spillovers)
provide a coherent explanation for persistent differences in income or growth across
countries.  Thus when the profitability of an investment is positively affected by
investment in a complementary investment, certain investments may only be
profitable in conjunction with other investments.  If a wide range of economic
activities have slight complementarities between them, agents may fail to coordinate
their investment decisions, through lack of communication or risk-aversion, and may
not invest in any of these activities.  The earliest work pointed out that a country
might not industrialize, if there are spillovers between industrial activities
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943).  Big Push theory points out that the State could take on the
role of stimulating and coordinating complementary investments, and thereby
unambiguously improve welfare.
Interesting as these theoretical possibilities are, the literature has rarely moved
beyond demonstrating the possibility of multiple equilibria and Pareto improvements
under different types of complementarities.  Empirical work as well has concentrated
on finding suggestive evidence of divergence in growth rates (Durlauf and Johnson
1995) or of multiple stationary equilibria (Fafchamps and Helms 1996).  The
feasibility or practicability of operationalizing a Big Push has received scant attention
since the 1940s, despite the apparent successes of pro-active investment policy in East
Asia.  Accordingly theory has not considered which factors hinder or facilitate a Big
Push.  This paper begins to fill that gap, by studying the problems that arose in the
implementation of a historical Big Push policy, in order to identify key issues and
incorporate those issues into existing theory.  The paper identifies obstacles to the
implementation of a Big Push that can lead to its collapse, and leave the country
worse off than before.
Section 1 of this paper is the first micro-level case study of a Big Push in the
context of a natural experiment.
2  It analyses the implementation of a Big Push in two
remarkably similar regions of Honduras, that had very different results.  The State
attempted to develop a range of complementary activities in agroexport production
and processing, by inducing farmers to plant the agroexports.  One of the principal
constraints on the Big Push were liquidity constraints, as might be expected in a
lower-income country.  The State allowed monopsonies to develop in one region, as a
cost-saving device: the monopsonies could subsist with lower initial outlay by the
State, and could solve certain market externality problems.  But the policy proved
disastrous, as the monopsonies led to the collapse of the Big Push.  The monopsonies
extracted rents from the farmers, to such an extent that farmers could not recover their
planting costs, and investment stagnated as a result.  The wide-ranging precautions
that the State had taken to avoid rent-extraction were easily circumvented by these
wealthy monopsonies.  The study provides conclusions about the dual role that market
power can play in developing complementary activities:  in an environment with
                                                
1    The seminal papers in the literature would include Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1989) for Big Push theory;  Romer (1986) and (1987) and Lucas (1988) for Endogenous
Growth theory.
2   See Park and Johnston (1995) for a country-level analysis of Taiwan, that describes certain aspects
of Taiwan’s policy as resembling a Big Push.3
strong institutions, market power in a key sector can significantly reduce the cost of a
Big Push.  However the same market power can completely undermine a Big Push,
even under far-sighted precautions by the State.  The implications are grim for
developing countries, most of which suffer from liquidity constraints and weak
institutional environments.  Implementing a Big Push in those countries may require
the State to actively (and expensively) foster competitive markets; consequently this
range of policies may not be affordable.
Case-study results are often difficult to generalize, however, as it is unclear to
which contexts the results apply.  The case-study literature has sometimes claimed
broader applicability than the evidence warrants.  Here one might well ask if market
power is likely to play a role in the broader, country-level contexts more generally
associated with Big Push models.  Therefore the formal section of this paper, Section
2, attempts to operationalize the role of market power and institutions within the
existing literature.  Small changes to a standard model of the Big Push yield results
that corroborate those of the case study.  The model serves as a theoretical tool,
making it relatively easy to introduce these considerations into existing models.  The
model is also suggestive of the generality of the results, as it indicates that market
power can play its dual role in widely different contexts.  In considering models of
market power from industrial organisation, it seems unlikely that all forms of market
power and market structure will lead to similar conclusions, or even that they can be
capture in an overarching model. Rather, the model presented is indicative of possible
outcomes.  The ensuing discussion seeks to clarify in which contexts market power
needs to be considered carefully by policymakers.
Section 1: Empirical Case Study
Over the 1970s and early 1980s the government of Honduras, in conjunction
with several development agencies, attempted the equivalent of a ‘Big Push’ to
develop the North of the country.  The aim was to develop agroexport crops and
downstream processing and exporting industries, as a basis for further industrial
development.  To establish these complementary activities, the Big Push policy
provided incentives for carefully coordinated investment.  The same policy was
implemented in a twin pair of valleys, nearly identical in natural characteristics and
resources.  Yet the Sula valley experienced agroexport adoption and growth, while in
the Aguan the Big Push was undermined by strategic behaviour.  The State, facing
strong liquidity constraints, made policy choices that lent critical importance to
market power and small differences in initial market conditions.
The analysis is centered on the Aguan Valley Project from 1970 to 1995, and
the causes of its failure.  The methodology of analysis belongs to comparative
economic history.  Hypotheses are developed inductively from the case study, but are
subjected to a consistency test, in that they must accord with the entire range and
complexity of available information, particularly comparisons of outcomes across
valleys and crops.  Primary sources can also supply evidence of motivations and
strategies that validate or refute hypotheses.
3  For clarity, however, here I will simply
outline and analyse key events, leaving the burden of historical proof for elsewhere
(see de Fontenay 1999).
4
                                                
3    See Greif (1993) for an application of the historical methodology to detecting strategic behaviour.
4    The case study is based on my fieldwork in Honduras in 1994 and 1995, including a systematic
comparison based on a farm survey of 80 households across the two valleys.  I also used several4
a)  The implementation of a Big Push
Most of the country’s fertile lowlands lie in the Aguan and Sula valleys,
identified in Map 1.
5  In the early part of the century, high profits in bananas had
induced the United Fruit Company (now part of United Brands) and the Standard
Fruit Company (now part of Dole Fruit) to establish railroads and vast banana
plantations in both valleys.  But after 1942, when an outbreak of Panama disease in
bananas led United to abandon the Aguan valley, the Aguan’s infrastructure rapidly
degraded and much of the land reverted to pasture or forest.  Only one railroad line
remained, in the upper part of the valley, serving some 5,000 hectares of bananas
belonging to Standard Fruit.  The derelict valley was ignored until the growing
population put pressure on many inhabited areas, and began agitating for land reform.
Accordingly the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded the re-
development of the valley in conjunction with a vast settlement project.  Over the
1970s the IADB built a road network and a modern port, and re-settled 4,700 families
on 101 agricultural cooperatives, covering 60,000 hectares of the richest land in the
valley, or about 60% of total arable area (see Table 2).
The primary purpose of the Aguan Valley Project was not resettlement, but the
establishment of agroexports and related industries (OAS 1962; IADB 1976:13).
Agroexport crops covered little of either valley in the 1970s, despite the fact that
agroexports generate the most profits and employment per hectare (Table 1).  At fault
was the lack of transportation infrastructure, but also a coordination problem inherent
to the crops in question.  Agro-exports from the tropics in the 1970s and 1980s
consisted of ‘plantation crops’, multi-year crops that require substantial up-front
planting costs, and a delay of two or more years before the first harvest. Plantation
crops also require processing or specialised shipping within a day of harvest: for
example, oil-palm fruit and sugarcane require crushing, and bananas must be packed
immediately and shipped in refrigerated containers.  The efficient scale in these post-
harvest activities—henceforward referred to as ‘processing’—was above one per
3,000 hectares by that time, itself well above the efficient scale for farms.
6   In an
                                                                                                                                           
surveys of the Aguan by the Land Tenure Center (LTC) of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the
1993 Honduran Agricultural Census and 1989 Honduran Labor Survey.  For comparative economic
history of the two regions,  I interviewed all of the exporting and processing companies in palm,
bananas and grapefruit, the major crops concerned, and selected representative among other crops.  I
also interviewed the government agencies involved in implementing the Big Push, and experts from the
universities, international organizations, and research institutes.  Primary historical sources include
contemporaneous reports on the Big Push projects:  the LTC (Jackson et al. 1986, Stanfield and
Childress 1989), Benoit Goud (1985) and the Inter-American Development Bank (1976, 1983, 1987)
all undertook direct survey and interview work among the project farmers.  Mario Posas (1992)
painstakingly recorded all evidence from primary sources on the history of Isletas banana cooperative.
The analysis of the banana industry is based on the economic analysis and primary historical evidence
in Melmed-Sanjak’s (1988) comparative study of Isletas and Guanchías cooperatives, major producers
in each region, and to the analytical economic history of multinational banana companies in Central
America by Ellis (1983).  Other historical sources include, for the Aguan region, a sociological history
of the Aguan valley project by Father Juan Angel Castro (1994), and a history of the city of Olanchito
by Posas (1993); and for the Sula, a history of the Guanchías and surrounding farms by Salgado (1981),
and a history of the early reform by Posas (1979).
5   The other vast lowland region, in the East, is characterised by notably infertile grasslands.
6  For example, bananas are harvested every week all year, and 3,000 to 5,000 hectares of bananas
would be needed to justify collection by the smallest of standard ships (Maillard 1991:54).  Palm
processing plants serve 7,000 to 10,000 hectares on average, in Honduras, well below efficient scale
elsewhere.5
earlier period integrated plantations would have introduced these crops and processed
them.  But plantations had their inefficiencies, and became more rare as crop prices
fell over the latter half of the century (see footnote DDD for discussion).  With the
transition to market transactions in these agroexports, the introduction of a new
agroexport faced a serious difficulty:  no farmer would undertake to plant the new
crop, unless he was certain that enough farmers were planting simultaneously to
induce the establishment of processing activities.
Table 1:  Labor-Days and Profits by Crop, per Hectare per Year
7
Labor Days Present Value Profits
in 1992 Lempiras





























    Labor Statistics Source: Ruben 1991: Appendix II.4. and Norton and Paz (1993:3).
    Profit Statistics:  IICA (1987) and Banco Central de Honduras (1994).      $1= 8 Lempiras in 1992.
Several development agencies sought to assist the government in meeting this
challenge, by providing incentives for farmers to invest simultaneously in the new
crops.  Cooperatives were given enough land to achieve efficient scale in growing
agro-exports, and ‘induced’ to produce certain crops.  A subset of cooperatives was
provided with credit to plant an agroexport crop on a share of their land: they were
allocated to oil-palm, bananas or grapefruit (Table 2).  The Honduran government
arranged for the processing of these crops.   A contract was signed with Standard Fruit
on behalf of the banana producers, ensuring shipping for the banana crop, and a
marketing board established to oversee the contract; another marketing agency was
established for grapefruit exports.  The government also built several palm-fruit
crushing mills with multilateral financing.  [Henceforth we will refer to “the State” as
the consortia of development agencies that funded the Aguan Valley Project, and
those parts of the central government with consonant objectives.]  Similar policies
were pursued in the Sula.
                                                
7   The profitability estimates are very recent, but little has changed since the 60s, except that the
relative profitability of ranching and basic grains declines over the entire period.  No data exists on the
profitability of African palm, one of the important plantation crops  (We refer to African palm as an
agro-export, although most of Honduras’ production over the 70s and 80s was consumed nationally,
because the crop is an important export worldwide, of high value per hectare, and it has similar
characteristics to other agro-exports).   No comparable data exist on profits from ranching, but those
profits appears to fall between basic grains production and agro-exports in profitability.6
Table 2:  Status of the Aguan Valley Project in 1983




Families 4,700 2,700 1,250
Cooperatives 101 54 1
Total Land Assigned 60,000 ha 29,220 ha 3,980 ha
Palm 7,786 ha 7,786 ha -
Grapefruit 1,798 ha 1,798 ha -
Bananas 2,035 ha - 2,076 ha
Estimated Total Arable Land
(based on Table 5; assumed to
be all land in use, 1993)
100,000 ha
  Source:  IADB Closure Report on the Aguan Valley Project (1983).
  See footnote DDD  for sources and calculation method for the final line;  based on 1993 Honduran Agricultural Census.
The Aguan Valley Project arguably resembled a Big Push in its essential
characteristics.  A Big Push problem is fundamentally defined by a timing problem—
generally, that investment by different agents must occur simultaneously, for
investment to be profitable—and a failure to coordinate investment to resolve the
timing problem.  A Big Push policy induces agents to invest simultaneously, when
otherwise pessimism or lack of communication would have deterred them.  Farmers
in the Aguan seeking to produce high-value agroexports needed vast numbers of their
neighbours to plant simultaneously; thus investment decisions were complementary,
and faced the typical timing problem.  Given the high costs of planting (and gestation)
and the risk-aversion of farmers, it was unlikely that they would resolve the
coordination problem.  Consequently the State induced simultaneous investment, by
establishing otherwise impoverished families in the area and providing credit.  As
these families had no collateral and no access to credit, the State’s supplying credit to
plant an agroexport crop had the same effect as paying their investment costs (noted
by Posas 1979:81).  The element of risk was removed, and thus the expected return to
investment was positive.
The policy also calls to mind the theoretical discussion of the “critical mass” –
the minimum number of persons that must be induced to invest, before others are
willing to do so without inducement (see for instance Da Rin and Hellmann 1997,
Matsuyama 1992).  Once the critical mass is known with certainty to be investing, the
spillovers between activities are significant enough that additional investors are
certain of earning profits, and they invest.  Theorists consider the critical mass to
determine the range of parameter values over which a Big Push is feasible;
policymakers would do so to determine whether the Big Push was affordable.  A
liquidity-constrained government would fund the investment of the critical mass only
(Section 2 will formalise this notion), and broadcast that information, leaving other
agents to invest of their own volition.  Thus the State takes minimum-cost action
sufficient to coordinate actions and allay pessimism.  The Aguan Valley Project fulfils
this prediction, in that the project funded what appears to be a critical mass.  Only a
subset of the cooperatives received credit to grow agroexports, and each of these
received credit to grow a specific crop, on a subset of its land.  Records of the project7
explicitly state that the aim of such a credit program was to establish enough crop area
to induce firms to build processing facilities (DDD).  It was expected that each
cooperative would use earnings from annual crops and agroexports to expand their
plantation, and that the remaining cooperatives would join in, when they had
accumulated some capital (IADB 1976:27).
8
Liquidity constraints will always be of paramount importance when we
consider the actual implementation of development policy.  Under liquidity
constraints, the State is likely to pursue policies to reduce costs, including policies to
reduce the size of the critical mass.  There is evidence that in Aguan, the State
pursued a special policy towards processors with such an aim.  Specifically, the State
fostered monopsonies in the processing of these crops.  If the processor is alone in the
market, she would break even with much less supply than duopsonists; therefore the
State needs to establish a much smaller area (a smaller critical mass) to induce a
monopsonist to build a processing plant, than a duopsony.  More, because a
monopsonist profits from the Big Push, she has an incentive to ensure its success, as
well as some power to ensure it.  She can affect market outcomes, internalise market
externalities, and so on. The strategy of fostering monopsonies is part of a more
general strategy of fostering market power in a Big Push.  As we will discuss below, it
has been shown that firms with market power have the motive and means to support
the State’s Big Push effort (this point was first observed by Da Rin and Hellmann
1997).
In the Aguan, the State had funded the Big Push by supplying credit, and
explicitly expected the processing monopsonies to be the subsequent source of credit.
The monopsonies had an incentive to encourage further planting of their input crop,
by supplying credit, and suffers from fewer credit market externalities than
competitive firms.  Given credit and insurance market failures, a common form of
credit in Latin America is a loan in the form of seeds or inputs from the buyer of the
crop, repaid in the form of a lower price for the crop at harvest.  The availability of
such credit is sharply limited by moral hazard:  it provides an incentive for the
borrower to secretly sell much of the harvest to another buyer, and claim a poor
outcome.  However a monopsony lending similar amounts to all its suppliers will not
suffer from such a strategy (theory and evidence from Conning 1996, in his study of
fruit-purchasing oligopsonies in Chile).
Prompted by liquidity constraints, the Honduran State also chose to foster
State-owned monopsonies whenever possible.  These had the further advantage of
allowing the State to use monopsony profits to reimburse itself, rather than depend on
the tax system, with its severe practical and political constraints.  It organised the
three palm-oil mills into a State-run firm, which would pass to the control of the
palm-producing cooperatives after the cost of their palm plantations had been repaid
from crop revenues.
9  Lacking expertise in the more sophisticated crop of bananas, it
signed a contract with Standard Fruit, the banana-exporter already operating in the
                                                
8   Thus for instance the World Bank was severely criticized by the IADB (“the State”) for starting a
ranching project on some of the fallow land in the valley.  Given the cost of the project, the IADB
argues, the land should be used for high-value crops and not ranching (IADB 1983:36).
9   The building of three mills does not contradict the claim that the State sought to establish a critical
mass.  Given the heavy transportation costs of palm-fruit, it was necessary to establish mills in several
locations of the valley.  Otherwise, more remote producers might refuse to plant, expecting their crop
to be neglected in favour of closer (and therefore cheaper) supply (Jones and Krummel 1987).8
Aguan, for the entire banana crop.
10  The State also undertook the grapefruit
exporting, but after dramatic failures signed a contract for export with Standard Fruit.
b)  The failure of the Big Push
The Aguan Valley Project was far from a resounding success.  Not much of
the new crops was planted beyond what the State had funded.  Consequently around
70% of the Aguan’s arable land remained under subsistence crops or pasture (see
Table DDD).  The project did not generate the hoped-for employment levels and
spinoff industries.  Outcomes will be analyzed in more detail below, but it seems clear
that the Big Push was unsuccessful.  The State’s efforts failed to generate the desired
takeoff of investment in agriculture and related industries.
The monopsony market structure developed by the State seems to be the root
cause of the stagnation in the Aguan.  Cooperatives who had planted agroexports
failed overall to recover their planting costs—in other words, they were “held up” by
the monopsonies that purchased their crop.  Definitionally, hold-up occurs when the
ex-post transaction price fails to compensate one party to the transaction for his ex-
ante investment in the transaction.  Although the State was far-sighted about the
potential perils of establishing monopsonies, and had taken precautions to limit their
market power, these precautions were inadequate to prevent hold-up.  Thus the
secondary cause of the failure was Honduras’ weak institutional structure, under
which no precaution could sustain a serious attack from firms with market power.
For clarity we will focus on the case of oil-palm.
11  The State placed all the
oil-crushing mills in the control of one firm, later named Coapalma, and established a
substantial supply of the crop.  As a result, Coapalma could potentially earn enormous
profits from charging monopsony prices for palm fruit.  Monopsony prices would be
hold-up prices, as they would only compensate growers for their yearly production
costs, and not their planting costs; nor would they induce further planting.  These
potential profits created strong incentives for those who controlled Coapalma to
charge hold-up prices, and for many agents to seek control of Coapalma.
Coapalma was initially managed by the National Agrarian Institute (INA).
The cooperatives were silent partners who would assume ownership when the
government’s expenditure was reimbursed (Castro 1994:69-70).  This period
demonstrated that government control was not a sufficient safeguard against hold-up
problems, as corruption rapidly developed.  The local INA office was publicly
denounced for activities such as ghost payrolling, stealing equipment, and other
abnormalities (La Tribuna 25/1/82, cited in Noe Pino 1986:135).  Coapalma had
ample revenues to extract, as officials paid very low prices for the palm fruit, and then
sold the oil to refineries at an advantageous price; they paid subsistence wages to
cooperative members who worked in the processing plant (Castro 1994:70).
The situation reached an impasse in 1980, when the cooperatives organised
country-wide demonstrations to protest the management of Coapalma, and gained
                                                
10  Standard might also be expected to have a lower critical mass than any other exporter, as its
shipments could combine bananas from its farm and the cooperative.
11   The case of banana exporting involved a number of additional complications, due principally to the
particular incentives and strategies of Standard as a world oligopolist  (see de Fontenay (1999) for
further details, and Melmed-Sanjak (1988)).9
control.
12  Coapalma became jointly owned by all the palm-producing cooperatives,
and its employees and elected board were all drawn from the cooperatives.  However,
the loose form of vertical integration developed failed to solve the problem.  Much of
Coapalma’s rank and file belonged to those cooperatives located nearer to its
headquarters, for reasons of accessibility.  A set of the nearby cooperatives—to which
I will now refer as ‘insiders’—gained ascendancy over Coapalma, through their
majority presence.  For instance, insider cooperatives always retained the majority of
seats on Coapalma’s Executive Board.
13  Evidence points to corruption within
Coapalma growing rampant, with Board members extracting huge sums, and insider
cooperatives obtaining significant perquisites.
14  The source of these funds was again
the price paid for palm fruit.  Coapalma’s prices settled at very low levels, relative to
mills in other areas.   Furthermore, Coapalma was entrusted with the reimbursement
of cooperatives’ loans, and retained some of the palm-fruit price for that purpose.
Corrupt accounting practices developed in the handling of such large sums, as
Coapalma leaders under-reported the amount repaid by cooperatives and absconded
with the difference; see footnote DDD for a valuation of the double-accounting
practices.  Table 4 provides a comparison of prices between Coapalma and a
cooperatively-owned mill in the Sula valley, Hondupalma, and a mill between the two
valley, Standard’s.  Coapalma’s (actual) prices are far lower, and even lower if we
adjust for the double-accounting practices.
15
                                                
12   In their protests they had the support of the international donors, who objected to INA’s corrupt
management.  In 1981 donors suspended disbursements until the cooperatives assumed control in 1982
(Noe Pino 1986:135).
13  A scathing commentary describes the electoral process for the Board of Directors thus:  “Deceitful
assemblies are held with purchased delegates to keep occupying director’s positions and to continue to
benefit from privileges and sinecures”  (Valladares and Chavez 1992:21, my translation). The
definition of ‘insiders’ arises from interviews with palm cooperatives in the Aguan ; five of the ten
interviewed styled themselves as “excluded from the benefits of Coapalma”  (San Isidro cooperative,
July 1995);  one explicitly described those cooperatives situated on the left bank of the Aguan river as
being isolated from the others (Suyapa cooperative, 6/95).
14  Noe Pino cites a case of literal extraction:  a newspaper scandal over the disappearance of $25,000
of farm equipment from Coapalma, that led to several arrests (1986:127).  Cooperatives reportedly
complained in interviews that the Board “became wealthy overnight. They not only obtain high
salaries, but they travel in luxury cars and they have built houses beyond their economic means”
(Valladares and Chavez 1992:14, my translation), and my interviews echo these complaints.
15  Coapalma’s nominal prices paid to growers appear to be only some 20% lower than in other plants.
Real prices were likely to be far lower, because Coapalma seems to have retained a share of the price,
and returned only a portion of it.  One of the Aguan’s two independent producers commented: “They
make deductions for a “savings plan” from your payment, and you can’t use these funds until
December.  Then there are deductions for payments to the Bank, and for fertilizer, which we could buy
for cheaper in San Pedro Sula.  After the deductions there is nothing left.”  (Interview, manager
Reginaldo Díaz, July 1995).  The most serious diversion of funds appears to be from debt servicing.
Recall that the advantage of creating a monopsony processor was that it could deduct repayments of the
State’s planting loans from the crop price without the growers selling elsewhere to avoid loan
repayment.  Internal documents from 1982 and 1986 verify that Coapalma collected 30 Lempiras per
ton toward reimbursing the state bank (Noe Pino 1986:147).  But comparing the groups’ total debts to
the state bank in 1985 and 1989 suggests that Coapalma over-charged groups by 67% on average, even
at the 11% interest rate charged by the state bank.  Simply incorporating this particular over-charge
reduces the effective price by another 20 Lempiras  (note that this figure is a floor, calculated for the
extreme assumption of a 25% interest rate).  And given that several insider cooperatives had no debts at
all by 1989, it is likely that the burden of this overcharge fell on the “outside” cooperatives.10
Table 3:  Palm Fruit Prices Paid by Different Processors










































Source:   Estimates for Standard Fruit by Engineer Erlindo Calix, Standard Fruit oil-palm division, (Interview, 1996) and
Coapalma (internal documents and receipts from a grower).  The “Coapalma reported” prices were provided after a later request.
**  These are the prices paid for fruit delivered to the plant; Standard & Coapalma offer subsidies which cover a part of the
transportation cost.
Monopsony pricing significantly deterred investment in the Aguan, which
confirms that these were indeed hold-up prices.  Only two farms in the Aguan entered
palm production after the initial Push.  Cooperative farms already invested in palm
production did little to expand their area or improve their yields, despite incentives
provided by Coapalma.  Average yields across Coapalma fell to 14 metric tons of fruit
per hectare, as opposed to 17 to 22 elsewhere.  This disinvestment was especially
marked among ‘outside’ cooperatives,
16 those that did not benefit from Coapalma’s
corruption.  Table 4 outlines cooperatives’ planting choices.  ‘Outsiders’ are roughly
categorized using several proxies: a remote (left-bank) location; and the fact that they
chose to sell out of Coapalma (and lose their share of profits) when land sales became
legal.
Table 4:  New Areas Planted in Palm, 1986-1990
% of Available Area
All Cooperatives
Most Central Cooperatives
Most Central who didn’t sell land
Left-Bank (Remote) Cooperatives






Source:  Carlos Ramon Rodriguez, head of Agricultural Operations Division, Coapalma. 1995
Coapalma’s early history highlights that neither State ownership, nor the loose
form of vertical integration subsequently established, was able to prevent hold-up in
the form of monopsony pricing and corruption.  Government supervision also failed
to solve any problems:  INA retained a supervisory role, but it was completely
                                                
16   The fact that any outside cooperatives invested at all is surprising, but less so when one considers
that many cooperatives had sunk into a debt trap with Coapalma (particularly outsiders, as they would
not receive an equal share of Coapalma’s profits).  No information was available as to what incentive
Coapalma offered for additional planting, but many may not have been able to refuse.11
ineffectual under Coapalma’s influence.
17  Coapalma’s subsequent history catalogues
the failure of competitive forces to prevent hold-up:  When a firm attempted to
establish a competing mill in the Aguan, Coapalma organised demonstrations against
the project, as an “attack on the cooperative sector”, and pressured the government
until his building permit was revoked.  When several mills attempted to ship their
palm fruit to the Sula Valley for processing, preferring to incur the high travel costs
and earn Sula prices, Coapalma reportedly arranged a form of blockade.  The one road
from the Aguan (see Map 2) is guarded by a military checkpoint, which was co-opted
by some means, and its guards at this checkpoint refused exit to trucks bearing palm
fruit.
18  It would seem that the potential rents from monopoly created both a motive
for monopoly pricing, and a source of funding for related corrupt activities, as
Coapalma used its monopoly rents to entrench its monopoly power.
19  The general
insight would be that under weak institutions, most safeguards against hold-up can be
overcome when there is a motive to do so.  Therefore any potential hold-up problem
is difficult to contain, even for a far-sighted planner.
c)  Hold-up:  implications and solutions
There are a number of logical questions raised by the evidence of a hold-up
problem.  First, one must ask why hold-up has been observed at all.  Contract theory
tends to assume that if agents are rational, they predict that they are likely to be held
up, and accordingly refuse to invest; hold-up is only observed if an agent has made a
mistake.  In the present case, it seems that someone did indeed make a mistake—the
State, which obliged the cooperatives to invest initially, mistakenly supposing that it
could limit the use of market power through precautionary measures. (Recall, by the
way, that ‘the State’ refers to those who designed the Big Push, rather than to those
government employees implicated in the corruption.)
A second question concerns the rationality of hold-up.  Because the prospect
of hold-up deters farmers from investing in planting, a monopsonist wishes to commit
not to hold up new investors.  For example the highly concentrated coffee-roasting
industry supported international regulation to set a price floor for coffee beans.  The
regulation provided a means of committing not to hold farmers up at harvest time
(analysis by McLaren 1992).  Unfortunately, weak institutions may not support any
affordable and credible commitments:  no contract or price law is credible if the
monopsonist can circumvent it.  One possible source of credible commitment under
weak institutions is the repeated nature of dealings between farmers and processors.
A monopsonist might find it worthwhile to refrain from holding up farmers who have
invested, to induce new investment.  Such an equilibrium is unlikely, however, given
that it depends on low interest rates, clearly-aligned expectations,
20 unused capacity,
                                                
17   INA’s failures may have been a result of its earlier problems in the Aguan, or the fact that its offices
and employees’ homes shared a compound with Coapalma, or more pernicious influences.  However, it
should be noted that the State established more autonomous regulatory agencies in the case of bananas,
who were similarly ineffectual.
18   These military checkpoints are notorious for their propensity to unlawfully stop trucks, generally to
extort a bribe for passage (Norton and Paz 1993:12).  Thus the practices alleged by the cooperatives in
the Aguan could have occurred.
19   The strategic behaviour described would accord with Grossman and Helpman’s analysis of
“Protection for Sale” (1994).  They demonstrate that protected industries will pay to maintain the
protection, leading to a vicious cycle of permanent protection.
20   McLaren’s (1992) model assumes it would be profitable for the monopsonist not to charge hold-up
prices if it led to further planting.  He demonstrates that if there is any uncertainty about agents’ beliefs12
and the need for relatively frequent investment—none of which conditions are present
in the Honduran case.
21
One final question is raised by the Aguan’s unstoppable hold-up problem:  can
any precautions can be successful under weak institutions?  The State took measures
against hold-up that covered many of the “safeguards” outlined by Williamson
(1985):
x  competitive pressures, which reduce agents’ bargaining power;
x  repeated interactions;
x  forms of vertical integration;
22
x  third-party enforcement, primarily legal/governmental constraints.
As recounted above, the Aguan witnessed the failure of multiple forms of the
above, but certain forms of competition and vertical integration remain be considered.
Vertical integration in its more traditional forms—such as the purchase of
farms by Coapalma, or the purchase of both farms and mills by private interests—was
illegal over most of the period.  In 1992 the Agricultural Modernisation Act legalised
the sale of cooperative farms to private entities, and over a third of all palm producing
firms sold out in the following three years.  The buyers were private consortia who
intended to build processing mills in the Aguan after consolidating their position (and
weakening Coapalma’s).  Using their combined influence, they were able to ship their
palm fruit out of the area, until they could build mills, and farmers joined in.  In
response to competitive pressure, the price of palm fruit rose rapidly, and new areas
were planted.  [Integration had even more striking effects in the banana industry.
Standard Fruit immediately bought out the banana cooperative, and bought an
additional 7,000 hectares of land on which to expand banana production.]  Such
evidence confirms the theoretical prediction that integration can resolve hold-up.
However theory also predicts that integration may be technically inefficient, while
unquestionably more efficient than a hold-up problem.  Evidence on the relative
efficiency of integrated plantations is unclear.
23  Considering Big Push policy more
generally, however, integration would be inefficient in many contexts.  Given that a
Big Push often seeks to stimulate a wide range of complementary activities, activities
may require a wide range of expertise.  If the Big Push can only be successful under
an inefficient form of integration, the benefits accruing to the country may not justify
the cost of the Big Push.
                                                                                                                                           
in the repeated game, the most likely outcome is the degenerate solution in which almost no farmers
plant, and the monopsonist holds up anyone who does plant.  In a related sense, the fact that no solution
was found to the hold-problem and related disinvestment may be attributable in part to uncertainty over
who had control of Coapalma, and for how long.
21  The importance of the sunk investment is probably the main determining factor.  The largest
expense in banana production is the initial land configuration, in terms of drainage and cables across
the entire area to slide banana stems into the packing plant.  In palm production, the five to seven years
before full production constitute a huge sunk cost; afterwards trees produce for another twenty years.
22  I include under vertical integration Williamson’s notion of ‘hostages’—assets belonging to one party
left to the use/control of the other party, to prevent hold-up (1985: Chapter 7).  Such alternatives were
not explored in great detail, in the Aguan Valley Project.
23   There is scant evidence, either in Honduras or worldwide, that large integrated plantations are
efficient (Tiffen and Mortimore 1990).  Most evidence points to the greater capital intensity of
integrated operations, while leaving open the question of efficiency.  There is reason to believe that
smaller self-owned farms may have an advantage in terms of labor and monitoring costs (DDD).  Such
farms can take advantage of some economies of scale without losing their cost advantage.  Farming and
processing also make use of very different skills and expertise.  Almost no new integrated plantations
have developed since the 60s (DDDD) which would seem to call their efficiency into question.13
Competition, on the other hand, has substantial advantages, as reflected in the
experience of the Sula.  The Sula stands as an example of ex-ante competition—
meaning that there was a competing firm engaged in processing from the outset.  The
Big Push in the Sula proceeded almost exactly as in the Aguan, with the same players:
the State gave control of the project’s oil mills to Hondupalma, a parallel association
of palm-producing cooperatives, and arranged for Standard Fruit to export all the
cooperatives’ bananas.  The critical difference lay in the competitive pressure from
United Fruit’s longstanding banana and oil-palm plantations.  Before the project
United’s processing operations were not supplied by independent farmers, probably
because of the hold-up problem.  But cooperatives that supplied Hondupalma or
Standard could improve their bargaining position (and price) by threatening to supply
United instead.  (It was a credible threat, as evidenced by the fact that several
cooperatives did in fact switch to supplying United.)
Evidence from the Sula underlines that farmers were keenly aware of the
ability of competition to protect them from hold-up.  One researcher quotes members
of the Hondupalma cooperatives at an early stages of the project, when the State had
declared its intention to build processing but had not progressed much in construction:
“Some palm plots are starting to produce and the National Agrarian Institute [INA]
hasn’t begun to build the processing plant.  So the groups are asking themselves what
they’ll do with future harvests, since the only possible buyer is San Alejo, property of
United Fruit, and they know that in that case they will impose the price they want, to
the harm of the peasants” (Fuentes 1980:29, my translation).  And indeed, the effect
of this mild form of competition was to raise prices high enough to avoid hold-up, and
encourage further investment.  Over 400 new farmers planted palm during the period
of the Big Push, as opposed to two new producers in the Aguan.  DDD Sula farms
began to produce bananas, but none in the Aguan.  Both palm and banana-producing
cooperatives in the Sula substantially expanded their crop area over this period
(DDD).
Another notable effect of ex-ante competition was that it led to further
competition. While efforts of competing processors to enter the Aguan were repulsed
by the incumbent monopolists in banana and palm, additional firms entered into
processing in the Sula, reinforcing the competitive structure of the market.  Because
no processor earned monopoly profits under ex-ante competition in the Sula, there
was substantially less struggle to secure or maintain control over processing.
Integration is less appealing, because it might lead to greater problems with market
power.  Integration might deter entry to these markets (Tirole 1988:196), and the
hold-up problem might shift to other markets related to the integrated markets, such as
markets for land or for agricultural inputs.
Establishing competitive markets from the outset appears to be a very
successful means of avoiding hold-up in a Big Push.  Note that it must be ‘from the
outset’—allowing a monopoly to develop, while expecting competitive entry later,
may simply give the monopoly the opportunity to erect barriers to entry, possibly to
exert influence to prevent entry, as in the case of the Aguan.  Yet, while effective,
fostering competition may involve substantial costs.   Recall that monopsonies were
developed, despite their pitfalls, in an effort to reduce the cost of a Big Push—
competition must therefore imply much higher costs.  A much larger critical mass
must be funded, market externalities must still be resolved, and so on.  If fostering
competition is too costly, the State may find Big Push policy unaffordable, in terms of
the cost of funds.14
d)  Results
The difference in aggregate performance between the Aguan and the Sula is
correspondingly striking.  Table 5 compares the relative crop areas in the two regions
in 1995.  This comparison is meaningful only because the two areas have remarkably
similar natural characteristics, in terms of area, climate and fertility, as demonstrated
by extensive soil and climate studies (see de Fontenay 1999: Appendix 1, based on
OAS 1962).  The Sula therefore provides something of a benchmark as to what is
feasible, given climate and soil fertility (and perhaps the functioning of credit
markets); it is probably due to these factors that the Sula still has so much land under
basic grains and pasture.
Recall that the Aguan Valley Project aimed to cover all of the undeveloped
fertile land with palm, bananas and grapefruit, depending on the soil characteristics.
The first thing to note is that the state was correct in its assessment of the coordination
problem:  none of the other agroexports that are flourishing in the Sula have
developed spontaneously in the Aguan.  Sugarcane, plantain and cocoa account for
20% of the Sula’s crop area, and 1% of the Aguan’s (these are small plots for local
use).  The next is that the Big Push crops have not filled the available space left by the
absence of these other crops, as over 20% more of the Aguan than the Sula is
undeveloped (under basic grains or pasture).  Thus performance in palm and bananas
was disappointing.  The Sula began with much more land under use, yet palm and
bananas expanded substantially over this period, as evidenced by the areas that are
newly-planted.
The Aguan’s performance in citrus is more mixed:  Grapefruit was the only
Big Push crop suitable for dry areas, and it failed completely.  Most of the grapefruit
farms were abandoned, because the technical requirements for commercial production
were beyond the skills of the cooperative farmers.  Fortunately a side project to
stimulate planting of oranges filled the void created by the collapse of the grapefruit
project.  This crop probably succeeded because strong local demand for consumption
created competition for the processor buying oranges (a processing plant in the Sula).
24  Oranges show dramatic success in expanding into the Aguan’s undeveloped areas,
but they are not suitable for the humid areas destined to palm and bananas.
A rough-and-ready measure of the social cost of the failure of the Big Push
would be that, based on averages of crop profitability estimates from Table 1, the
Aguan valley would be generating US $200 Million more in profits if it had as much
land under agro-exports as the Sula valley. Ironically, $200 Million (both in 1985
dollars) was almost exactly the cost of the Project.  The comparison gives some idea
of the social cost of the Project failure—as much was wasted as was spent.
                                                
24 Oranges could not be grown in the Sula over this period, because of an environmental problem.
Therefore no direct comparisons are possible for that crop.15
Table 5: Distribution of Land in Use in the Aguan and Sula Valleys, 1993
AGUAN: Area under
Seedlings      Adult Plants % *
SULA: Area under
         Seedlings      Adult Plants % *
Sugarcane 40 97 0.1 553 10,603 11.1
Cocoa 19 48 0.1 725 1,981 2.7
Plantains 203 315 0.5 1,335 5,330 6.6
Bananas 28 6,962 7.0 533 12,671 13.1
Oil Palm 5,585 9,524 15.0 3,946 8,641 12.5
Oranges 3,063 3,887 6.9 1,158 2,144 3.3
Grapefruit 0 298 0.3 170 193 0.3
Other Citrus
& Pineapple
37 38 0.1 262 573 0.8
SUBTOTAL 8,975 21,169 30.0 8,682 42,136 50.5
Other Fruits







TOTAL # 100,536 100.0 # 100,536 100.0
    *   The “ % “  column is defined as  the area under seedlings and adult plants as a percentage of the total.
Source:  1993 Honduran Agricultural Census.
25
Aguan valley definition: Municipalities of Trujillo, Sabá, Sonaguera, Tocoa, and Bonito Oriental from the province of Colón.
Olanchito from the province of Yoro.    Sula valley definition:  Municipalities of San Pedro Sula, Choloma, Pimienta, Potrerillos,
Puerto Cortes, San Manuel, Villanueva and La Lima from the province of Cortes.  El Negrito and El Progreso from the province
of Yoro. Tela  from the province of Atlántida.
The Aguan’s relative performance is equally disappointing in other
dimensions.   Despite the Project’s efforts to remedy rural unemployment and
landlessness, the Aguan generates only half as much agricultural employment as the
Sula (Table 5).  This comparison looks at narrow measures of agricultural
employment, and does not even take into account the spillovers engendered by high
output in the Sula, leading to greater employment.  Indeed results in terms of
spillovers in the Aguan are particularly bleak.  In the Sula, banana production has
generated box factories and puree plants in the Sula area, and palm production has
ushered in refineries and factories producing cooking-oil, and detergents.  None of
these spinoff industries has developed in the Aguan.
                                                
25 Agro-export and tree crop information is drawn from the 1993 Agricultural Census, by summing
over the counties that fall in the two valleys.  Unfortunately the counties in question include not only
the Aguan and the Sula, but substantial area from adjoining hillsides and mountains.  These areas
would distort estimates of crop distribution for the valleys, because plantation crops cannot be grown
on hillside land.  Thus figures for area under basic grains and pasture are unusable, because they
include important hillside areas.  The figures on total area must be rejected, because they include
hillside land and unusable land.  The estimates of area under coffee are excluded from agro-exports,
because coffee is a hillside crop.  As a result, one can only look at the distribution of land in use by
uses, not total land.  Percentages of land in use under basic grains and pasture were obtained from
earlier technical assessments of the division of land in the Sula, and a local economist’s assessment in
the Aguan (IHDER 1983).  Because the two valleys are so similar, as demonstrated in Appendix E,  I
assume they both have the same area of farmland in use; this probably over-estimates the Aguan’s
productive area, since the Aguan’s land use is less intensive in general.  Total areas were extrapolated
from these percentages and the Census figures on agro-export crop areas.16
Table 5:  Total Rural Agricultural Employment for Farmers and Farm Workers







Farmers 12,923 15,312     18
Farm Workers 8,023 20,695   158
TOTAL 20,946 36,007     72
Source: 1988 Population Census.   The Departments of Colon and Cortes are taken as proxies for the Aguan
and the Sula, respectively.  The amounts of hillside and valley land in Colon and Cortes are comparable.  Therefore
we assume that outcomes are similar in hillside areas, in order to compare outcomes across valleys.
The evidence from Honduras does suggest that market power can be
extremely damaging to a Big Push, in the presence of weak institutions.  Market
power in Honduras led to hold-up and to stagnation of the Big Push effort.  However,
when institutions are strong enough to contain market power, it appears to confer
important advantages.  The State encouraged market power to develop in Honduras
because it drastically reduced the cost of the Big Push.  These realisations lead to a
three-tiered ordering of preferences, when implementing a Big Push:  if institutions
are strong, then the State would prefer to foster and effectively contain market power,
than to foster competitive markets and increase the cost of the Big Push.  Under weak
institutions, however, market power would undermine the Big Push, and is to be
avoided at all costs; the State would prefer to foster competition, albeit at a cost, or to
abandon the Big Push altogether.  Indeed, the prognosis for a Big Push is much
bleaker than was previously thought:  countries with weak institutions may very well
not be able to afford the cost of a Big Push under competitive markets.
                        preferred to
preferred to
                                                State’s budget line?
Figure 1:  Policy Options for a Big Push
FAILURE OF BIG PUSH:
Market power and
            Weak institutions
COSTLY BIG PUSH:
Competition and
            Weak institutions
PREFERRED BIG PUSH:
Market power and
            Strong institutions17
Section 2:  Market Power in a model of the Big Push
While the case study confers a critical role on market power and the strength
of institutions, these issues find no reflection in existing Big Push theory.  This
section returns to the theory, to highlight its peculiar relationship to market power:
most models depend on the assumption of market power, yet exclude any strategic
role for market power through their assumptions.  A model is developed that slightly
modifies the standard assumptions in order to allow for strategic market power—
defined as the ability to significantly influence other firms’ decisions through market
choices (prices, investments and so on).
The case study yielded an extremely sharp preference ordering: market power
among investors and strong institutions, over competition,  over market power under
weak institutions.  It also predicted that if agents overestimated the strength of
institutions, they would be held up.  If the State overestimated the strength of
institutions (and agents did not) agents would not respond to incentives and the Big
Push would collapse.  These powerful conclusions about market power cannot persist
in every situation, for every type of market power.  After all, the Industrial
Organisation literature has made clear that market power can play an immense range
of roles.  But these conclusions are sufficiently general that the existing Big Push
literature can exactly reproduce them, with only slight departures from the standard
model.
a)  The model
Generally speaking, the need for a Big Push arises from increasing returns in
the form of spillovers between agents, and of alternative investment opportunities that
do not take advantage of the increasing returns.  Individual maximising behaviour
may not lead an economy to take advantage of increasing returns, in the presence of
alternatives, and a Big Push would seek to change individual incentives.
Many Big Push models have sought to derive increasing returns from
increasing specialization, an important characteristic of industrial growth.  Either
utility functions or production functions exhibit the characteristic known as “love of
variety”—that is, output or utility is higher for a larger number of inputs.  The most
common functional form chosen is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989, Rodriguez-Clare 1996, Ciccone and
Matsuyama 1996; see Matsuyama 1995 for a survey of these models).  For example,
suppose the final good X is produced from a range of n intermediate industrial goods,
















i x X ,         where 0<U<1.
This functional form, from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), exhibits constant returns for a
fixed number of goods, so that a market equilibrium exists, but increasing returns to
scale in the number of goods.
Often the final good is assumed to be produced competitively, but each
intermediate good is produced by a firm in monopolistic competition with the other
                                                
26  Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987) pointed out that a  CES production function could either represent
the production of one good with the N inputs, or, in the limit, the production of a wide range of goods,
each of which requires a specialised input or a close substitute to its ideal input (see formal proof by
Weitzman 1994).  The latter idea, especially, conveys the notion of increasing returns to scale.18
input producers (see for instance Ciccone and Matsuyama 1996); elsewhere it is the
final-production sector, or the research sector, that is monopolistically competitive.
Monopolistic competition between complementary goods is at the heart of these
models, as it expresses the strategic interdependency of producers’ decisions, and
creates the possibility of multiple equilibria.  A producer’s decision to invest in this
sector depends on how many other producers he expects to invest.  Note that while
producers all have market power (as they price above marginal cost), and act
strategically, strategic market power has been assumed away.  Since by definition
other inputs are close substitutes at any output level, no input producer could affect
production by withholding its input.  Yet in many production processes one good is
more essential than others, in a range of complementary products.  In that case the
producer of that good would have strategic market power, in that he could
significantly affect market outcomes and incentives.  The force of this criticism will
greatly depend on the context, as we will discuss below.
The appropriate way to introduce strategic market power seems to be to
amplify the already existing market power.  The functional form for the increasing-
returns sector is slightly modified to render one of the inputs,  y, essential:
D D ￿






i ,         where 0<D<1.( 1 )
The present model allows for two different investment choices, one with the
above increasing-returns structure, in order to derive the dual-equilibria structure of a
Big Push model.  It posits a two-sector economy, in which the industrial good X is
produced from intermediate inputs, according to equation (1).  The other sector,
“mining”, exhibits constant returns to scale; wages in this sector are normalised to
one.  For simplicity all production is exported, and all consumption goods imported.
The industrial sector faces a declining demand curve while the mining sector has
infinitely elastic demand.  It is assumed efficient to have both sectors in operation,
given the size of the labour force, with the industrial sector drawing workers from
mining at their opportunity cost, the mining wage.  But the industrial sector may not
develop.
If the industrial sector does develop, its final-good producers are competitive
and therefore cost-minimising:
D D ￿
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The final goods sector will expand until  PX = C(X), that is until  P =O , where O is




































The intermediate-good producers are assumed to offer their inputs at a fixed
price to the final export sector, and to choose their price based on the resulting
demand functions.  Producing a good xi involves a marginal cost, a, and an initial
sunk investment, whose per-period value is F.  These are all labour costs.  The x-
producers maximise their profit function taking P as given.  This is a standard
assumption in models of monopolistic competition.
27  Substituting the P =O condition
into the maximisation problem:
Max p x ax F Max P x y ax F ii i i i   
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Using the definition of X, the equations in (3) can be aggregated to express y as an
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The efficiency of industrial production will depend on n, the number of
intermediate inputs available.  Final-good producers are assumed to observe the
number of intermediate goods available, and then to decide whether to produce the
final good.  When few intermediate inputs are available, final output will be small or
may even be zero (depending on the shape of world demand); in such a case demand
for intermediate inputs will be too small for them to break even.  Notice that equation


















[Henceforth the notation will distinguish between behavioural equations, defining
equilibrium behaviour when there is an industrial sector, marked by numbers and
parentheses, and conditions for the existence of an industrial sector, marked by letters
and brackets.]  If the industrial sector does develop, condition [a] will hold with
equality, as x-producers will enter until it binds.
Therefore agents face a coordination problem in investing in the production of
x-goods.  Agents are assumed to be risk-averse
28 and to have no means of
                                                
27 We will retain the assumption to preserve comparability with earlier models and simplicity of
notation.  However, the assumption seems a little extreme in cases where a x-producer expects to be the
only producer of x-goods in the market.
28  Formally, we describe agents as risk-averse if their behaviour is “minimax” among all possible Nash
equilibria.  If one of the possible Nash equilibria is that the industrial sector does not develop—if it
does not necessarily develop even when they are the only x-producer—they do not invest in x-
production.  If the industrial sector necessarily develops when they produce, and they break even, then
the only remaining Nash equilibrium is one in which x-producers enter until they break even, at n*, and
we will assume this equilibrium occurs.20
coordinating their decisions.  No producer can observe investment and supply
decisions of other x-producers, before making investment decisions.   As a result, no
risk-averse producer of an x-good will invest unless he expects to earn profits even if
he is alone in producing, and in such circumstances a Big Push is often necessary to
introduce industrial production.
Only the supply commitments of the y-producer(s) are assumed to be
observable by other agents before they make their investment decisions.  Thus a y-
producer could potentially use her “visibility” to influence the decisions of other
producers.  She could, for instance, make quantity or price commitments that rendered
investing more attractive to other agents.  Her ability to do so depends on the
competitive structure of the y-sector, and her ability to make credible commitments.
Thus, for modelling purposes, the definition of the “strength” of institutions is
restricted to the ability to enforce contracts or other forms of credible commitment.
This definition is not as narrow as it first seems, as much of institutional analysis
focuses on the feasibility and cost of upholding commitments under different
institutions (see Williamson 1985).
This section will compare outcomes under three different cases:  when several
firms produce y under Bertrand competition (c); when a monopoly produces y and can
commit to supply a certain quantity to the market ((ea), for ex-ante strategic); and
when no commitment mechanisms exist ((ep), for ex-post strategic).
29  The results
derived echo the case-study.
The y-producer will be assumed to have no sunk investment to make, and the
same marginal cost, a.  Including sunk costs would complicate the modelling of
competition (as firms could never break even under pure Bertrand competition).  It
would confer and additional advantage on monopoly production, because competition
would imply the costly duplication of sunk costs.  This is an important benefit of
market power in practice:  considering spillovers that generate increasing returns will
often imply increasing-returns technologies in practice, and therefore a loss of
efficiency under competition.  However, the model will focus on the strategic benefits
of market power.
Proposition 1:   There exists a range of parameter values under which the industrial
sector develops without the need for a Big Push.  The set of such values for the (ea)
case contains the set for the (c) case, which in turn contains the set of such values for
the (ep) case (Figure 1).
Proof of (c) versus (ep):  The proof will demonstrate that a Big Push is not needed
under (c), if not needed under (ep).
Under (c), because y-producers are competing Bertrand, they price at marginal
cost, a, and the equilibrium is, after substitution:
Pna  
￿￿ ￿ DD D DD
12 1 1 () ( 5 )
A Big Push will be necessary under (c) if no x-producer finds it profitable to
unilaterally invest.  x-producers are assumed to be pessimistic, and refuse to invest in
the hopes that other firms might enter.  The first x-producer to enter will lose profits if
final goods producers do not find it profitable to produce (if P is less than the right-
                                                
29   No two firms will ever choose to produce the same x-good, under Bertrand competition, as they
would be obliged to price at marginal cost and earn losses.  Therefore each new x-producer is assumed
to introduce a differentiated good.21
hand side in 1, for all feasible values of X), or if there is insufficient demand for x to
cover its fixed costs.
Social planner would create an industrial sector
Big Push not needed under (ea)
      BP not needed under (c)
     BP not needed under (ep)
Figure 2:  The space of parameter values
Therefore a Big Push is unnecessary under (c) if and only if, at n=1, a value of y
exists that solves equation (5) and allows the x producer to break even:
and
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(obtained by substituting the lowest value of X for which the x-producer breaks even).
Alternatively, y is produced by a monopolist, taking into account the strategic
effect of her decisions on x-producers.  The y-producer no longer charges her
marginal cost, but she can never extract more than her marginal product from the
competitive sector, whatever her market power (proof is straightforward; see Romer
1994:27 for discussion).  However, she can choose the profit-maximising level of y to
supply.    In the case in which the y-producer cannot make credible commitments
(ep), x-producers are aware that, once a number “n” of them have invested, the y-
producer will maximise her profits, taking n as given.
Suppose industrial production takes place.  The y-producer charges his
marginal product to a final-good producer, which is (from (4)):
MP P
y

















Recall that the final-goods producers take P as given. Substituting this price of y into
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      [c]
In comparing [b] and [c], note that the second condition is identical in both
cases, while the first differs only by the term “Q”.  Based on the first equation of each
bracket, the solution value of y will be smaller under (ep), and therefore the second
condition will be harder to fulfil, if the left-hand-side of the second condition is
monotonically increasing in y.  Monotonicity can be shown to be equivalent to
positive marginal revenue, which will hold for any value of X under consideration.
Thus a Big Push is never necessary under (c), when it is unnecessary under (ep).
Proof of (ea) versus (c):  The proof will demonstrate that a Big Push is not needed
under (ea), if not needed under (c).  The proof focuses on the specific case in which
quantity commitments can be made:
Assumption:  Under (ea), the y-monopolist can commit ex-ante to produce a certain
quantity.
Suppose a Big Push is not needed under (c).  Let y1 be the output of the
competitive y-producers if only one x-producer entered.  Under (ea) the monopolist
could commit to producing that same quantity y1.  She would be assured of breaking
even if only one x-producer entered.  Her profits at a fixed y are increasing in n, we
will show, and therefore she will earn weakly positive profits at y1, even if more x-
producers enter.
Showing that Sy increases as n increases, holding y constant, is equivalent to
showing that PX increases, given that :23
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Let yea be the profit-maximising level for the monopolist to commit to, under (ea).  In
fact the y-producer will commit to this profit-maximising yea, if a Big Push is not
needed under (c), as it will yield at least as much profit as she earns at y1.  She
chooses yea by taking into account that it will determine nea, the equilibrium
(breakeven) number of x-producers who enter.  Given that industrial production takes









































Therefore, given (ea) and an announced yea, if it is profitable for nea >1  producers to
operate in the market together, it is profitable for one producer to enter, and industrial
production will develop spontaneously.
As a concluding point, note that the firm with market power and credibility
(ea) cannot bring about the development of the industrial sector under all initial
conditions.  There are still parameter values for which a Big Push would be Pareto
improving.
30  Thus the question of the cost of a Big Push is relevant.
                                                
30  An example of a Pareto-improving Big Push will suffice:  Suppose that the monopolist does not
invest because she narrowly missed breaking even at the optimal yea.  Taking into account that y is paid












The State commits to pay an amount “G” of the fixed costs of every x-producer who invests, so that
fixed costs are now (F-G) from their point of view.  The social benefit of having industrial production
will be:    
SB PX ax ay nF




























Given the initial yea presupposed, the social benefit will be positive so long as yea would fall
significantly in response to a fall in fixed costs:
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Proposition 2:  When a Big Push is necessary in order to develop the industrial
sector, the cost of the Big Push is lower under (ea) than under (c), which in turn is
lower than under (ep).
Proof that costs of a Big Push are lower under (c) than (ep):
Potential x-producers are assumed to be risk-averse, in the sense that they do
not expect other firms to invest, unless it would be irrational for other firms not to do
so.  They do not accept the State’s assurance that it is simultaneously inducing other
firms to invest.  However it is assumed observable that the State has convinced a
producer to invest.  Therefore the State has to compensate the first producer for any
negative profits he would earn at n=1, the second for any negative profits he would
earn at n=2, and so on.  A Big Push would induce entry of x-producers until
subsequent x-producers would enter of their own accord; this is the lowest value of n ,
denoted nLow, at which both final-goods producers and x-producers break even.  In
response x-producers will enter until n*.
31  Figure 3 illustrates the profits of an x-
producer under competition (c).  Suppose the government is encouraging an x-
producer to enter, and that there will be n firms in the market once he enters. If final-
goods producers are not producing at that n, then the State must expend F to induce
his entry.  If final-goods producers are producing an insufficient amount for him to
break even, the State must expend G=-Si(n) < F, the value of his loss at n.
       
                                                     Si
 
          0
       nLow                            n*                        n
              
        - F
Figure 3: Profits of an x-good producer, by the total number of producers
Suppose that a Big Push is needed under (ep) and (c), and consider the outlay
on each x-producer.  The outlay is F if no final goods are produced.  Final-good
production might be profitable under (c) and not under (ep) (see Proof of 1); in that
case the outlay under (c), G, is less than the outlay under (ep).  When final goods are
produced in both cases, the top equations of [b] and [c] hold.  Those equations imply
that, at a given n:
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31 An industrial sector can be artificially maintained by paying one x-producer to enter and produce, but
a self-sustaining industrial sector more accurate description of a Big Push.  The result is the same,
however, under that definition: costs are equal or less under competition (c) than under (ep).25
Pep > Pc        Xep > Xc         yep < yc
    xep  <  xc    so long as  MR>0
    Sep   <  Sc        Gep   <  Gc .
Furthermore the value of nLow for which x-producers break even will be (weakly)
smaller. 
Proof that costs of a Big Push are lower under (ea) than under (c):
The only relevant case is when a Big Push is needed under both (ea) and (c).
Suppose that under (c) the State must spend a sum $S on x-producers to bring about
the Big Push.  Then a strategic y-producer would always find it weakly profitable to
bring about the industrial sector after the outlay $S (if only by making quantity
commitments equivalent to prices py=a).  He might also find it profitable to bring
about industrial production after a lesser lower outlay, $Sc.    
Finally we have a pair of propositions regarding the effect of overestimating
the strength of institutions:
Proposition 3:  If x-producing firms were to invest in the presence of market power,
mistakenly believing that commitments would be upheld—in other words, if they
believed themselves to be in case (ea) when in fact it was (ep)—they would be held up.
Proposition 4:  If the State mistook (ep) for (ea) the Big Push would fail (as it would
not expend a sufficient amount), and the economy would be worse off than before the
Big Push.  (This point follows directly from Proposition 2.)
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose that x-producers mistakenly believe that the y-producer can make
credible commitments.  Once she makes commitments, a number nea of x-producers
invests—the number that would break even under (ea).  Therefore [a] holds with
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Treating all xi as constants, henceforth, the above yields the implicit relationship
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12 1 1 ( )          under (ea).( 8 )
Recall from (3) the equilibrium conditions under (ep), for any number of x-producers:























12 1 1 () ( 9 )
Consider both equations for the case where nea of the x-producers have entered.  If the
monopolist is able to break commitments and behave according to (ep), prices and
quantities will take on the following values:
  Pep    >  Pea
  Xep    <   Xea
  xep     <   xea     from (4’),  so long as  MR > 0  over this range
  S(xep) <   S( xea) = 0.
Therefore if nea x-producers have entered, and are breaking even under (8), they do
not break even at nea if y reneges, and are thus held up. 
b)  General applicability of the result
Existing models can easily be modified to account for market power, the
above demonstrates.  The remaining question is, precisely when is it important to
incorporate considerations of market power in formulating Big Push policy?
There is already evidence that market power is critical in a surprising number
of contexts.  Da Rin and Hellmann (1997) were among the first to notice that a firm
with sufficient market power could usher in the industrial sector single-handedly.  In
their model a leading bank could loan funds at preferential rates to many potential
investors, to encourage investment in industrialisation.  They demonstrate that this
ability is directly linked to the extent of the bank’s market power.  [Note that their
model assumes that some credible commitments can be made, as banks supply credit
and expect to be repaid.]   Their results hold for a very general formulation of
complementarities between investors.  Justman (1995) examines monopoly provision
of a new type of infrastructure, more efficient than the old type when enough agents
invest in using it.  He demonstrates that the monopolist can bring about sufficient
investment (although socially optimal levels of investment) for a wide range of initial
values.  He points out that the monopolist’s ability to induce investment is sharply
curtailed when she cannot make credible commitments.
32
In situations where a firm possesses strategic market power vis-à-vis
complementary investors—that is, where it has a significant impact on their profits—
it will almost always play a critical role, if not a dual role.  The result that market
power can have a negative influence seems quite robust.  One firm’s ability to
manipulate market outcomes to increase its own profits or bargaining power will often
reduce others’ incentives to invest.  However it is less likely that market power can
have a positive influence under most structures of timing and information, as its
principal means of influence is to signal and make commitments to other investors.
                                                
32   “the capacity to commit to future fees can enable a monopoly to establish an infrastructure that it
could not establish otherwise” (Justman 1995: Footnote 14).27
Market power could still have a positive impact, if high expected profits increase the
firm’s incentive to invest, without too much reducing the profitability of others’
investments.  It is with such an effect in mind that many CES-based theories have
tended to view any increase in market power as beneficial (Romer 1994, Baland and
François 1996).
33  Increases in profits to the increasing-returns sector at the expense
of competitive sectors can indeed be beneficial—but only if it does not confer
asymmetrically large strategic market power on any firm.
Not all Big Push problems concern firms with strategic market power.  Only
certain types of complementarities can endow firms with strategic influence.
Complementarities must be ‘strong,’ in the sense that a change in one activity’s price
or output has strong repercussions on the profitability of other activities.  Earliest Big
Push and endogenous growth theory focused on extremely ‘weak’ complementarities
across all agents in the economy, such as individual investments in human capital
(Lucas 1988), or pecuniary externalities (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989).  But
when we consider technological complementarities, many of these exhibit stronger
complementarities.  Production of a range of complementary goods often depends on
certain critical inputs, including infrastructure.  Consider for example the recent
growth in the Internet industry, attributable to weak network spillovers between
firms—and strong spillovers from web browsing to these firms.  A firm with
monopoly control over web browsing would have immense strategic market power
over Internet firms.
34
In considering technological complementarities it also becomes clear that
these need not be economy-wide to have a significant impact on the economy.
Spillovers may be concentrated at the level of a region, a city, an industry, an industry
in a city—the growth of the computer industry in the San Francisco area, for example,
is generally attributed to spillover effects  (Saxenian 1994, Krugman 1991a on
regional effects more generally).  Industrial policies may resemble a Big Push more
often than macroeconomic policies—consider the effort to develop the Korean
chemical industry (Lee 1992).  When complementarities are more concentrated they
will involve fewer firms, and one or more may have strategic influence.  Our
assumption tends to be that vertical or horizontal integration will resolve any potential
coordination or hold-up problems when spillovers are concentrated between a ‘small’
number of firms.  But how small is ‘small’?  Whether integration is efficient will
depend of the number of firms involved and the breadth of their activities (the
similarities between their areas of expertise).  Some of the difficulty is that integration
may have to encompass every firm with sunk costs, otherwise integrating the firm(s)
                                                
33   Paul Romer (1994) gave expression to this understanding of market power.  He considers a Cobb-




D).  Z is produced abroad, and a firm wishing to import Z must incur fixed costs.
Therefore a firm supplies Z only if profits are above fixed costs, and the fixed costs serve as a threshold
level of profits.  A monopolist who introduces Z increases output by L
1-DX
D but captures only DL
1-DX
D.
Because the structure of production is CES, he concludes that “any intervention [referring to import
tariffs] that prevents a new activity from coming into existence will be bad for development.”
(1994:30).  Because the monopolist’s decision to supply is always beneficial, any factor that reduces
his profits below his threshold is socially harmful; limiting his market power through regulation would
be likewise harmful.
34 Note that the development of the Internet and related services was initially very slow, due to what we
would label “coordination failure.”  Its development might have been faster had one company had
primary control, and taken on a role similar to the government’s role in the case of the Minitel system
in France.  However, there is also natural concern over the implications of one company, such as
Microsoft, gaining control of the supply of Internet services.  It might extract most of the rents from
Internet activities, and so deter further investment and innovation.28
at risk of hold-up could merely shift the hold-up problem into another trading
relationship.  Returning to our example of the Internet, integrating a monopoly
browser firm with firms selling products on the Internet would place firms selling
design software in jeopardy of hold-up.  Consequently vertical integration will not be
an effective solution in every coordination problem with strategic market power.
The pervasiveness of strategic problems and coordination problems together
raises serious questions.  When firms are not investing in complementary industries,
the cause may lie in a coordination failure, or a hold-up problem, or both (see Figure
4).   Disentangling the two is a challenge.  This important point was raised by Greif
and Rodriguez-Clare (1995).  They provide historical evidence that the early growth
of a multifirm automobile and parts industry in Detroit greatly attenuated hold-up
problems.  Firms would locate in Detroit not only to benefit from technological
spillovers, but also to avoid hold-up.  It is unclear whether areas that began with an
automobile industry but failed to expand were more hampered by hold-up problems or
insufficient spillovers (DDD check if this is right).  Continuing this line of thought, an
apparent technological backwardness might be due to inefficient integration to resolve
hold-up.  Therefore the first step for successful policy must be to identify exactly
which factors are preventing firms from taking advantage of spillovers.
   size of sunk costs
           
       
                     integration is
          efficient
    coordination 
    problems                market power is important
                                                                                                                              narrowness of
                       complementarities
Figure 4:  Coordination problems, market power and integration
4)  Conclusion
Until now, market power has received little attention in the Big Push literature.
The types of complementarities the models initially focused on were unlikely to give
rise to market power, and the functional forms in these models abstracted away from
it.  However when one considers technological complementarities, it is often the case
that certain investments—such as infrastructure or certain critical inputs—can yield
significant influence to the investing firm.  Likewise in the presence of narrow29
spillovers—spillovers within a region or industry—firms are more likely to possess
strategic market power.
Therefore market power can potentially play an important role in a number of
situations; it is sufficient for an influential activity to be concentrated.  The empirical
and theoretical evidence presented here suggests that when market power is critical,
institutional strength is likewise critical.  Market power has dramatically positive or
negative effects, depending on the strength or weakness of institutions.  As a result,
countries unsure of their institutional strength should sheer away from trying to reap
the benefits of market power, and even engage in costly efforts to foster competition.
Thus the Big Push becomes much more expensive in the presence of institutional
weaknesses.  Many Pareto-improving Big Push policies may not be implemented
because of their excessive cost.
These conclusions should amplify considerably our estimates of the cost of
institutional weaknesses.  The cost has generally been reckoned in terms of individual
transactions: one expects hold-up to deter more individual investments under weaker
institutions, given that fewer situations can be resolved through contracting.  But the
case study provides evidence that entire industries or regions might fail to develop
because of hold-up problems among complementary investments.  Likewise, the
conclusions are suggestive of how much growth influential private firms could
potentially bring about, under stronger institutions.  Further investigation of the
magnitude of hold-up problems is called for.
Finally, these conclusions stress the importance of the government’s role in
supporting market transactions.  Development economics has emphasized the
importance of government’s role as ‘market maker’ (DDD)—providing infrastructure,
information and enforcement.  This role has received less attention with the
resurgence of Big Push and growth theories, perhaps because the emphasis of ‘market
making’ has always been microeconomic (rural cereal markets, and so on DDDD).
But considering the implementation of a Big Push highlights how essential this role is
to development.  Further research (and expenditure) on policies to strengthen market
institutions is clearly necessary.  One such policy may be to create competitive
markets, and reduce the scope for hold-up problems.  This new market-making
strategy is suggested by the outcomes under weak institutions.  Indirectly it may
strengthen institutions, by preventing firms with market power from placing undue
stress on them.  Reducing the pressure from influence groups may allow market
institutions to develop unhindered.30
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